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Abstract
We revisit the classical decision-theoretic problem of weighted expert
voting from a statistical learning perspective. In particular, we examine
the consistency (both asymptotic and finitary) of the optimal Nitzan-
Paroush weighted majority and related rules. In the case of known expert
competence levels, we give sharp error estimates for the optimal rule.
When the competence levels are unknown, they must be empirically esti-
mated. We provide frequentist and Bayesian analyses for this situation.
Some of our proof techniques are non-standard and may be of independent
interest. The bounds we derive are nearly optimal, and several challenging
open problems are posed. Experimental results are provided to illustrate
the theory.
1 Introduction
The problem of weighting the input of several experts arises in many situations
and is of considerable theoretical and practical importance. The rigorous study
of majority vote has its roots in the work of Condorcet (1785). By the 70s, the
field of decision theory was actively exploring various voting rules (see Nitzan &
Paroush (1982) and the references therein). A typical setting is as follows. An
agent is tasked with predicting some random variable Y ∈ {±1} based on input
Xi ∈ {±1} from each of n experts. Each expert Xi has a competence level pi ∈
(0, 1), which is the probability of making a correct prediction: P(Xi = Y ) = pi.
Two simplifying assumptions are commonly made:
(i) Independence: The random variables {Xi : i ∈ [n]} are mutually indepen-
dent.
(ii) Unbiased truth: P(Y = +1) = P(Y = −1) = 1/2.
We will discuss these assumptions below in greater detail; for now, let us just
take them as given. (Since the bias of Y can be easily estimated from data, only
the independence assumption is truly restrictive.) A decision rule is a mapping
f : {±1}n → {±1} from the n expert inputs to the agent’s final decision. Our
quantity of interest throughout the paper will be the agent’s probability of error,
P(f(X) 6= Y ). (1)
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A decision rule f is optimal if it minimizes the quantity in (1) over all possible
decision rules. Nitzan & Paroush (1982) showed that, when Assumptions (i)–
(ii) hold and the true competences pi are known, the optimal decision rule is
obtained by an appropriately weighted majority vote:
fOPT(x) = sign
(
n∑
i=1
wixi
)
, (2)
where the weights wi are given by
wi = log
pi
1− pi , i ∈ [n]. (3)
Thus, wi is the log-odds of expert i being correct — and the voting rule in
(2), also known as naive Bayes (Hastie et al., 2009), may be seen as a simple
consequence of the Neyman-Pearson lemma (Neyman & Pearson, 1933).
Main results. The formula in (2) raises immediate questions, which appar-
ently have not previously been addressed. The first one has to do with the
consistency of the Nitzan-Paroush optimal rule: under what conditions does
the probability of error decay to zero and at what rate? In Section 3, we show
that the probability of error is controlled by the committee potential Φ, defined
by
Φ =
n∑
i=1
(pi − 12 )wi =
n∑
i=1
(pi − 12 ) log
pi
1− pi . (4)
More precisely, we prove in Theorem 1 that
− logP(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) ≍ Φ,
where ≍ denotes equivalence up to universal multiplicative constants. Another
issue not addressed by the Nitzan-Paroush result is how to handle the case where
the competences pi are not known exactly but rather estimated empirically by
pˆi. We present two solutions to this problem: a frequentist and a Bayesian one.
As we show in Section 4, the frequentist approach does not admit an optimal
empirical decision rule. Instead, we analyze empirical decision rules in various
settings: high-confidence (i.e., |pˆi − pi| ≪ 1) vs. low-confidence, adaptive vs.
nonadaptive. The low-confidence regime requires no additional assumptions,
but provides weaker guarantees (Theorem 5). In the high-confidence regime,
the adaptive approach provides error estimates in terms of the empirical pˆis
(Theorem 10), while the nonadaptive approach gives a bound in terms of the
unknown pis, but still gives useful asymptotics (Theorem 9). The Bayesian so-
lution sidesteps the various cases above, as it admits a simple, provably optimal
empirical decision rule (Section 5). Unfortunately, we are unable to compute
(or even nontrivially estimate) the probability of error induced by this rule; this
is posed as a challenging open problem.
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2 Background and related work
Machine learning theory typically clusters weighted majority (Littlestone &War-
muth, 1989, 1994) within the framework of online algorithms; see Cesa-Bianchi
& Lugosi (2006) for a modern treatment. Since the online setting is considerably
more adversarial than ours, we obtain very different weighted majority rules and
consistency guarantees. The weights wi in (2) bear a striking similarity to the
Adaboost update rule (Freund & Schapire, 1997; Schapire & Freund, 2012).
However, the latter assumes weak learners with access to labeled examples,
while in our setting the experts are “static”. Still, we do not rule out a possible
deeper connection between the Nitzan-Paroush decision rule and boosting. In
a recent line of work Lacasse et al. (2006); Laviolette & Marchand (2007); Roy
et al. (2011) have developed a PAC-Bayesian theory for the majority vote of
simple classifiers. This approach facilitates data-dependent bounds and is even
flexible enough to capture some simple dependencies among the classifiers —
though, again, the latter are learners as opposed to our experts. Even more
recently, experts with adversarial noise have been considered (Mansour et al.,
2013). More directly related to the present work are the papers of Berend &
Paroush (1998), which characterizes the consistency of the simple majority rule,
and Boland et al. (1989); Berend & Sapir (2007) which analyze various models
of dependence among the experts.
3 Known competences
In this section we assume that the expert competences pi are known and analyze
the consistency of the Nitzan-Paroush optimal decision rule (2). Our main result
here is that the probability of error P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) is small if and only if the
committee potential Φ is large.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the experts X = (X1, . . . , Xn) satisfy Assumptions
(i)-(ii) and f : {±1}n → {±1} is the Nitzan-Paroush optimal decision rule.
Then
(i) P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) ≤ exp (− 12Φ).
(ii) P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) ≥ 3
4[1 + exp(2Φ + 4
√
Φ)]
.
Open problem. Exhibit (if possible) a function g : R→ R such that
P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) ≍ g(Φ).
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 1.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1(i)
Define the {0, 1}-indicator variables
ξi = 1{Xi=Y }, (5)
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corresponding to the event that the ith expert is correct. A mistake fOPT(X) 6=
Y occurs precisely when1 the sum of the correct experts’ weights fails to exceed
half the total mass:
P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) = P
(
n∑
i=1
wiξi ≤ 1
2
n∑
i=1
wi
)
. (6)
Since Eξi = pi, we may rewrite the probability in (6) as
P
(∑
i
wiξi ≤ E
[∑
i
wiξi
]
−
∑
i
(pi − 12 )wi
)
. (7)
A standard tool for estimating such sum deviation probabilities is Hoeffding’s
inequality. Applied to (7), it yields the bound
P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) ≤ exp
(
−2
[∑
i(pi − 12 )wi
]2∑
i w
2
i
)
, (8)
which is far too crude for our purposes. Indeed, consider a finite committee of
highly competent experts with pi’s arbitrarily close to 1 and X1 the most com-
petent of all. Raising X1’s competence sufficiently far above his peers will cause
both the numerator and the denominator in the exponent to be dominated by
w21 , making the right-hand-side of (8) bounded away from zero. The inability of
Hoeffding’s inequality to guarantee consistency even in such a felicitous setting
is an instance of its generally poor applicability to highly heterogeneous sums, a
phenomenon explored in some depth in McAllester & Ortiz (2003). Bernstein’s
and Bennett’s inequalities suffer from a similar weakness (see ibid.). Fortu-
nately, an inequality of Kearns & Saul (1998) is sufficiently sharp to yield the
desired estimate: For all p ∈ [0, 1] and all t ∈ R,
(1 − p)e−tp + pet(1−p) ≤ exp
(
1− 2p
4 log((1− p)/p)t
2
)
. (9)
Remark 1. The Kearns-Saul inequality (9) may be seen as a distribution-
dependent refinement of Hoeffding’s (which bounds the left-hand-side of (9) by
et
2/8), and is not nearly as straightforward to prove. An elementary rigorous
proof is given in Berend & Kontorovich (2013b). Following up, Raginsky & Sa-
son (2013) gave a “soft” proof based on transportation and information-theoretic
techniques.
Put θi = ξi − pi, substitute into (6), and apply Markov’s inequality:
P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) = P
(
−
∑
i
wiθi ≥ Φ
)
(10)
≤ e−tΦEexp
(
−t
∑
i
wiθi
)
.
1Without loss of generality, ties are considered to be errors.
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Now
Ee−twiθi = pie
−(1−pi)wit + (1 − pi)epiwit
≤ exp
( −1 + 2pi
4 log(pi/(1− pi))w
2
i t
2
)
(11)
= exp
[
1
2 (pi − 12 )wit2
]
,
where the inequality follows from (9). By independence,
E exp
(
−t
∑
i
wiθi
)
=
∏
i
Ee−twiθi
≤ exp
(
1
2
∑
i
(pi − 12 )wit2
)
= exp
(
1
2Φt
2
)
and hence
P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) ≤ exp ( 12Φt2 − Φt) .
Choosing t = 1 yields the bound in Theorem 1(i).
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1(ii)
Define the {±1}-indicator variables
ηi = 21{Xi=Y } − 1, (12)
corresponding to the event that the ith expert is correct and put qi = 1 − pi.
The shorthand w ·η =∑ni=1 wiηi will be convenient. We will need some simple
lemmata:
Lemma 2.
P(fOPT(X) = Y ) =
∑
η∈{±1}n
max {P (η), P (−η)}
and
P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) =
∑
η∈{±1}n
min {P (η), P (−η)} ,
where
P (η) =
∏
i:ηi=1
pi
∏
i:ηi=−1
qi.
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Proof. The identities (5), (6) and (12) imply that a mistake occurs precisely
when
n∑
i=1
wi
ηi + 1
2
≤ 1
2
n∑
i=1
wi,
which is equivalent to
w · η ≤ 0. (13)
Exponentiating both sides,
exp (w · η) =
n∏
i=1
ewiηi
=
∏
i:ηi=1
pi
qi
·
∏
i:ηi=−1
qi
pi
=
P (η)
P (−η) ≤ 1. (14)
We conclude from (14) that among two “antipodal” atoms ±η ∈ {±1}n, the
one with the greater mass contributes to the probability being correct and the
one with the smaller mass contributes to the probability of error, which proves
the claim.
Remark 2. The proof of Lemma 2 also establishes the optimality of the Nitzan-
Paroush decision rule.
Lemma 3. Suppose that s, s′ ∈ (0,∞)m satisfy
m∑
i=1
(si + s
′
i) ≥ a
and
1
R
≤ si
s′i
≤ R, i ∈ [m]
for some R <∞. Then
m∑
i=1
min {si, s′i} ≥
a
1 +R
.
Proof. Immediate from
si + s
′
i ≤ min {si, s′i} (1 +R).
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Lemma 4. Define the function F : (0, 1)→ R by
F (x) =
x(1 − x) log(x/(1− x))
2x− 1 .
Then sup0<x<1 F (x) =
1
2 .
Proof. Deferred to the Appendix.
Continuing with the main proof, observe that
E [w · η] =
n∑
i=1
(pi − qi)wi = 2Φ (15)
and
Var [w · η] = 4
n∑
i=1
piqiw
2
i .
By Lemma 4,
piqiw
2
i ≤ 12 (pi − qi)wi,
and hence
Var [w · η] ≤ 4Φ. (16)
Define the segment I ⊂ R by
I =
[
2Φ− 4
√
Φ, 2Φ + 4
√
Φ
]
. (17)
Chebyshev’s inequality together with (15) and (16) implies that
P (w · η ∈ I) ≥ 3
4
. (18)
Consider an atom η ∈ {±1}n for which w ·η ∈ I. The proof of Lemma 2 shows
that
P (η)
P (−η) = exp (w · η) ≤ exp(2Φ + 4
√
Φ), (19)
where the inequality follows from (17). Lemma 2 further implies that
P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) ≥
∑
η∈{±1}n:w·η∈I
min {P (η), P (−η)}
≥ 3/4
1 + exp(2Φ + 4
√
Φ)
,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 3, (18) and (19). This com-
pletes the proof.
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4 Unknown competences: frequentist approach
Our goal in this section is to obtain, insofar as possible, analogues of Theorem 1
for unknown expert competences. When the pis are unknown, they must be
estimated empirically before any useful weighted majority vote can be applied.
There are various ways to model partial knowledge of expert competences (Ba-
harad et al., 2011, 2012). Perhaps the simplest scenario for estimating the pis
is to assume that the ith expert has been queried independently mi times, out
of which he gave the correct prediction ki times. Taking the {mi} to be fixed,
define the committee profile by k = (k1, . . . , kn); this is the aggregate of the
agent’s empirical knowledge of the experts’ performance. An empirical decision
rule fˆ : (x,k) 7→ {±1} makes a final decision based on the expert inputs x
together with the committee profile. Analogously to (1), the probability of a
mistake is
P(fˆ(X,K) 6= Y ). (20)
Note that now the committee profile is an additional source of randomness. Here
we run into our first difficulty: unlike the probability in (1), which is minimized
by the Nitzan-Paroush rule, the agent cannot formulate an optimal decision
rule fˆ in advance without knowing the pis. This is because no decision rule
is optimal uniformly over the range of possible pis. Our approach will be to
consider weighted majority decision rules of the form
fˆ(x,k) = sign
(
n∑
i=1
wˆ(ki)xi
)
(21)
and to analyze their consistency properties under two different regimes: low-
confidence and high-confidence. These refer to the confidence intervals of the
frequentist estimate of pi, given by
pˆi =
ki
mi
. (22)
4.1 Low-confidence regime
In the low-confidence regime, the sample sizes mi may be as small as 1, and we
define2
wˆ(ki) = wˆ
LC
i := pˆi − 12 , i ∈ [n], (23)
which induces the empirical decision rule fˆLC. It remains to analyze fˆLC’s
probability of error. Recall the definition of ξi from (5) and observe that
E [wˆLCi ξi] = E[(pˆi − 12 )ξi] = (pi − 12 )pi, (24)
2For mi min {pi, qi} ≪ 1, the estimated competences pˆi may well take values in {0, 1}, in
which case log(pˆi/qˆi) = ±∞. The rule in (23) is essentially a first-order Taylor approximation
to w(·) about p = 1
2
.
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since pˆi and ξi are independent. As in (6), the probability of error (20) is
P
(
n∑
i=1
wˆLCi ξi ≤
1
2
n∑
i=1
wˆLCi
)
= P
(
n∑
i=1
Zi ≤ 0
)
, (25)
where Zi = wˆ
LC
i (ξi − 12 ). Now the {Zi} are independent random variables,
EZi = (pi − 12 )2 (by (24)), and each Zi takes values in an interval of length 12 .
Hence, the standard Hoeffding bound applies:
P(fˆLC(X,K) 6= Y ) ≤ exp

− 8
n
(
n∑
i=1
(pi − 12 )2
)2 . (26)
We summarize these calculations in
Theorem 5. A sufficient condition for P(fˆLC(X,K) 6= Y )→ 0 is
1√
n
n∑
i=1
(pi − 12 )2 →∞.
Several remarks are in order. First, notice that the error bound in (26) is
stated in terms of the unknown {pi}, providing the agent with large-committee
asymptotics but giving no finitary information; this limitation is inherent in the
low-confidence regime. Secondly, the condition in Theorem 5 is considerably
more restrictive than the consistency condition Φ → ∞ implicit in Theorem 1.
Indeed, the empirical decision rule fˆLC is incapable of exploiting a single highly
competent expert in the way that fOPT from (2) does. Our analysis could
be sharpened somewhat for moderate sample sizes {mi} by using Bernstein’s
inequality to take advantage of the low variance of the pˆis. For sufficiently large
sample sizes, however, the high-confidence regime (discussed below) begins to
take over. Finally, there is one sense in which this case is “easier” to analyze
than that of known {pi}: since the summands in (25) are bounded, Hoeffding’s
inequality gives nontrivial results and there is no need for more advanced tools
such as the Kearns-Saul inequality (9) (which is actually inapplicable in this
case).
4.2 High-confidence regime
In the high-confidence regime, each estimated competence pˆi is close to the true
value pi with high probability. To formalize this, fix some 0 < δ < 1, 0 < ε ≤ 5,
and put
qi = 1− pi, qˆi = 1− pˆi.
We will set the empirical weights according to the “plug-in” Nitzan-Paroush
rule
wˆHCi := log
pˆi
qˆi
, i ∈ [n], (27)
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which induces the empirical decision rule fˆHC and raises immediate concerns
about wˆHCi = ±∞. We give two kinds of bounds on P(fˆHC 6= Y ): nonadaptive
and adaptive. In the nonadaptive analysis, we show that for mimin {pi, qi}i ≫
1, with high probability |wi − wˆHCi | ≪ 1, and thus a “perturbed” version of
Theorem 1(i) holds (and in particular, wHCi will be finite with high probability).
In the adaptive analysis, we allow wˆHCi to take on infinite values
3 and show
(perhaps surprisingly) that this decision rule also asymptotically achieves the
rate of Theorem 1(i).
Nonadaptive analysis. Define ε˜ ∈ (0, 1) by ε = 2ε˜+ 4ε˜2 or, explicitly,
ε˜ =
√
4ε+ 1− 1
4
. (28)
Lemma 6. If
ε˜2mipi ≥ 3 log(2n/δ), i ∈ [n], (29)
then
P
(
∃i ∈ [n] : pˆi
pi
/∈ (1− ε˜, 1 + ε˜)
)
≤ δ.
Proof. The multiplicative Chernoff bound yields
P (pˆi < (1 − ε˜)pi) ≤ e−ε˜
2mipi/2
and
P (pˆi > (1 + ε˜)pi) ≤ e−ε˜
2mipi/3.
Hence,
P
(
pˆi
pi
/∈ (1− ε˜, 1 + ε˜)
)
≤ 2e−ε˜2mipi/3.
The claim follows from (29) and the union bound.
Lemma 7. Let wi be the optimal Nitzan-Paroush weight (3). If
1− ε˜ ≤ pˆi
pi
,
qˆi
qi
≤ 1 + ε˜
then
|wi − wˆHCi | ≤ ε.
3When the decision rule is faced with evaluating sums involving ∞−∞, we automatically
count this as an error.
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Proof. We have
|wi − wˆHCi | =
∣∣∣∣log piqi − log
pˆi
qˆi
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣log pipˆi − log
qˆi
qi
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣log pipˆi
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣log qˆiqi
∣∣∣∣ .
Now4
[log(1− ε˜), log(1 + ε˜)] ⊆ [−ε˜− 2ε˜2, ε˜]
⊆ [− 12ε, 12ε],
whence ∣∣∣∣log pipˆi
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣log qˆiqi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Corollary 8. If
ε˜2mimin {pi, qi}i ≥ 3 log(4n/δ), i ∈ [n],
then
P
(
max
i∈[n]
|wi − wˆHCi | > ε
)
≤ δ.
Proof. An immediate consequence of applying Lemma 6 to pi and qi with the
union bound.
To state the next result, let us arrange the plug-in weights (27) as a vector
wˆ
HC ∈ Rn, as was done with w and η from Section 3.1. The corresponding
weighted majority rule fˆHC yields an error precisely when
wˆ
HC · η ≤ 0
(cf. (13)). Our nonadaptive approach culminates in the following result.
Theorem 9. Let 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < ε < min {5, 2Φ/n}. If
mimin {pi, qi}i ≥ 3
(√
4ε+ 1− 1
4
)−2
log
4n
δ
, i ∈ [n], (30)
then
P
(
fˆHC(X,K) 6= Y
)
≤ δ + exp
[
− (2Φ− εn)
2
8Φ
]
. (31)
4The first containment requires log(1 − x) ≥ −x − 2x2, which holds (not exclusively) on
(0, 0.9). The restriction ε ≤ 5 ensures that ε˜ is in this range.
11
Remark 3. For fixed {pi} and mini∈[n]mi →∞, we may take δ and ε arbitrar-
ily small — and in this limiting case, the bound of Theorem 1(i) is recovered.
Proof of Theorem 9. Since
|w · η − wˆHC · η| = |(w − wˆHC) · η|
≤
n∑
i=1
|wi − wHCi | = ‖w− wˆHC‖1 ,
we have
P (wˆHC · η ≤ 0) ≤ P(‖w − wˆHC‖1 > εn) + P(w · η ≤ εn).
Corollary 8 upper-bounds the first term on the right-hand side by δ. The second
term is estimated by replacing Φ by Φ− εn in (10) and repeating the argument
following that formula.
Adaptive analysis. Theorem 9 has the drawback of being nonadaptive, in
that its assumptions (30) and conclusions (31) depend on the unknown {pi} and
hence cannot be evaluated by the agent (the bound in (26) is also nonadaptive).
In the adaptive approach, all results are stated in terms of empirically observed
quantities:
Theorem 10. Put5
δ =
n∑
i=1
1√
mi
and let R be the event
exp
(
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(pˆi − 12 )wˆHCi
)
≤ δ
2
. (32)
Then
P
(
R ∩
{
fˆHC(X,K) 6= Y
})
≤ δ.
Remark 4. Our interpretation for Theorem 10 is as follows. The agent ob-
serves the committee profile K, which determines the {pˆi, wˆHCi }, and then checks
whether the event R has occurred. If not, the adaptive agent refrains from mak-
ing a decision (and may choose to fall back on the low-confidence approach de-
scribed previously). If R does hold, however, the agent predicts Y according to
fˆHC. As explained above, there does not exist a nontrivial a priori upper bound
on P(fˆHC(X,K) 6= Y ) absent any knowledge of the pis. Instead, Theorem 10
5 Actually, as the proof will show, we may take δ to be a smaller value, but with a more
complex dependence on {mi}, which simplifies to 2[1− (1 − (2
√
m)−1)n] for mi ≡ m.
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bounds the probability of the agent being “fooled” by an unrepresentative commit-
tee profile.6 Observe that for mini∈[n]mi ≫ 1, we have pˆi ≈ pi and wˆHCi ≈ wi,
and thus Theorem 1(i) is recovered as a limiting case. Note that we have done
nothing to prevent wˆHCi = ±∞, and this may indeed happen. Intuitively, there
are two reasons for infinite wˆHCi : (a) noisy pˆi due to mi being too small, or (b)
the ith expert is actually highly (in)competent, which causes pˆi ∈ {0, 1} even for
large mi. The 1/
√
mi term in the bound ensures against case (a), while in case
(b), choosing infinite wˆHCi causes no harm (as we show in the proof).
Proof. We will write the probability and expectation operators with subscripts
(such as K) to indicate the random variable(s) being summed over. Thus,
PK,X,Y
(
R ∩
{
fˆHC(X,K) 6= Y
})
= PK,η (R ∩ {wˆHC · η ≤ 0})
= EK [1R · Pη (wˆHC · η ≤ 0 |K)] .
(33)
Recall that the random variable η ∈ {±1}n, with probability mass function
P (η) =
∏
i:ηi=1
pi
∏
i:ηi=−1
qi,
is independent of K, and hence
Pη (wˆ
HC · η ≤ 0 |K) = Pη (wˆHC · η ≤ 0) . (34)
Define the random variable ηˆ ∈ {±1}n (conditioned on K) by the probability
mass function
P (ηˆ) =
∏
i:ηi=1
pˆi
∏
i:ηi=−1
qˆi,
and the set A ⊆ {±1}n by A = {x : wˆHC · x ≤ 0} . Now
|Pη (wˆHC · η ≤ 0)− Pηˆ (wˆHC · ηˆ ≤ 0)| = |Pη (A)− Pηˆ (A)|
≤ max
A⊆{±1}n
|Pη (A)− Pηˆ (A)|
= ‖Pη − Pηˆ‖TV
≤
n∑
i=1
|pi − pˆi| =:M,
where the inequality follows from a standard tensorization property of the total
variation norm ‖·‖
TV
, see e.g. (Kontorovich, 2012, Lemma 2.2). By Theo-
rem 1(i), we have
Pηˆ (wˆ
HC · ηˆ ≤ 0) ≤ exp
(
− 12
n∑
i=1
(pˆi − 12 )wˆHCi
)
,
6These adaptive bounds are similar in spirit to empirical Bernstein methods, (Audibert
et al., 2007; Mnih et al., 2008; Maurer & Pontil, 2009), where the player’s confidence depends
on the empirical variance.
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and hence
Pη (wˆ
HC · η ≤ 0) ≤M + exp
(
− 12
n∑
i=1
(pˆi − 12 )wˆHCi
)
.
Invoking (34), we substitute the right-hand side above into (33) to obtain
PK,X,Y
(
R ∩
{
fˆHC(X,K) 6= Y
})
≤ EK
[
1R ·
(
M + exp
(
− 12
n∑
i=1
(pˆi − 12 )wˆHCi
))]
≤ EK[M ] + EK
[
1R exp
(
− 12
n∑
i=1
(pˆi − 12 )wˆHCi
)]
.
By the definition of R, the second term on the last right-hand side is upper-
bounded by δ/2. To estimate M , we invoke a simple mean absolute deviation
bound (cf. Berend & Kontorovich (2013a)):
EK |pi − pˆi| ≤
√
pi(1− pi)
mi
≤ 1
2
√
mi
,
which finishes the proof.
Remark 5. The improvement mentioned in Footnote 5 is achieved via a refine-
ment of the bound ‖Pη − Pηˆ‖TV ≤
∑n
i=1 |pi − pˆi| to ‖Pη − Pηˆ‖TV ≤ α ({|pi − pˆi| : i ∈ [n]}),
where α(·) is the function defined in Kontorovich (2012, Lemma 4.2).
Open problem. As argued in Remark 4, Theorem 10 achieves the optimal
asymptotic rate in {pi}. Can the dependence on {mi} be improved, perhaps
through a better choice of wˆHC?
5 Unknown competences: Bayesian approach
A shortcoming of Theorem 10 is that when condition R fails, the agent is left
with no estimate of the error probability. An alternative (and in some sense
cleaner) approach to handling unknown expert competences pi is to assume a
known prior distribution over the competence levels pi. The natural choice of
prior for a Bernoulli parameter is the Beta distribution, namely
pi ∼ Beta(αi, βi)
with density
pαi−1i q
βi−1
i
B(αi, βi)
, αi, βi > 0,
where qi = 1−pi and B(x, y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)/Γ(x+y). Our full probabilistic model
is as follows. Each of the n expert competences pi is drawn independently from
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a Beta distribution with known parameters αi, βi. Then the i
th expert, i ∈ [n],
is queried independently mi times, with ki correct predictions and mi − ki
incorrect ones. As before, K = (k1, . . . , kn) is the (random) committee profile.
Absent direct knowledge of the pis, the agent relies on an empirical decision
rule fˆ : (x,k) 7→ {±1} to produce a final decision based on the expert inputs x
together with the committee profile k. A decision rule fˆBa is Bayes-optimal if
it minimizes
P(fˆ(X,K) 6= Y ), (35)
which is formally identical to (20) but semantically there is a difference: the
probability in (35) is over the pi in addition to (X, Y,K). Unlike the frequentist
approach, where no optimal empirical decision rule was possible, the Bayesian
approach readily admits one. For a given x ∈ {±1}, define I+(x) to be the set
of YES votes
I+(x) = {i ∈ [n] : xi = +1}
and I−(x) = [n] \ I+(x) to be the set of NO votes. Let us fix some A ⊆ [n],
B = [n] \A and compute
P(Y = +1, I+(X) = A, I−(X) = B)
=
n∏
i=1
∫ 1
0
pαi−1i q
βi−1
i
B(αi, βi)
(
mi
ki
)
pkii q
mi−ki
i p
1{i∈A}
i q
1{i∈B}
i dpi
=
n∏
i=1
(
mi
ki
)
pkii q
mi−ki
i
B(αi, βi)
∫ 1
0
p
αi+ki−1+1{i∈A}
i q
βi+mi−ki−1+1{i∈B}
i dpi
=
n∏
i=1
(
mi
ki
)
B(αi + ki + 1{i∈A}, βi +mi − ki + 1{i∈B})
B(αi, βi)
.
Analogously,
P(Y = −1, I+(X) = A, I−(X) = B)
=
n∏
i=1
(
mi
ki
)
B(αi + ki + 1{i∈B}, βi +mi − ki + 1{i∈A})
B(αi, βi)
.
Let us use the shorthand P (+1, A,B) and P (−1, A,B) for the joint proba-
bilities in the last two displays, along with their corresponding conditionals
P (±1 |A,B). Obviously,
P (1|A,B) > P (−1|A,B) ⇐⇒ P (1, A,B) > P (−1, A,B),
which occurs precisely if
n∏
i=1
B(αi + ki + 1{i∈A}, βi +mi − ki + 1{i∈B})
>
n∏
i=1
B(αi + ki + 1{i∈B}, βi +mi − ki + 1{i∈A}).
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This is equivalent to∏
i∈A
(αi + ki)
∏
i∈B
(βi +mi − ki) >
∏
i∈B
(αi + ki)
∏
i∈A
(βi +mi − ki),
which further simplifies to
∏
i∈A
αi + ki
βi +mi − ki >
∏
i∈B
αi + ki
βi +mi − ki .
Hence, the choice
wˆBai = log
αi + ki
βi +mi − ki
guarantees that the decision rule
fˆBa(x,k) = sign
(
n∑
i=1
wˆBai xi
)
maximizes the probability of being correct for each input x ∈ {±1}n. Notice
that for 0 < pi < 1, we have
wˆBai −→mi→∞wi, i ∈ [n],
almost surely, both in the frequentist and the Bayesian interpretations. Unfor-
tunately, although
P(fˆBa(X,K) 6= Y ) = P(wˆBa · η ≤ 0)
is a deterministic function of {αi, βi,mi}, we are unable to compute it at this
point, or even give a non-trivial bound. One source of the problem is the
coupling between wˆBa and η.
Open problem. Give a non-trivial estimate for P(fˆBa(X,K) 6= Y ).
6 Experiments
It is most instructive to take the committee size n to be small when comparing
the different voting rules. Indeed, for a large committee of “marginally compe-
tent” experts with pi =
1
2 + γ for some γ > 0, even the simple majority rule
fMAJ(x) = sign(
∑n
i=1 xi) has a probability of error decaying as exp(−4nγ2),
as can be easily seen from Hoeffding’s bounds. The more sophisticated voting
rules discussed in this paper perform even better in this setting. Hence, small
committees provide the natural test-bed for gauging a voting rule’s ability to
exploit highly competent experts. In our experiments, we set n = 5 and the
sample sizes mi were identical for all experts. The results were averaged over
105 trials. Two of our experiments are described below.
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Low vs. high confidence. The goal of this experiment was to contrast the
extremal behavior of fˆLC vs. fˆHC. To this end, we numerically optimized the
p ∈ [0, 1]n so as to maximize the absolute gap
∆n(p) := P(f
LC(X) 6= Y )− P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ),
where fLC(x) = sign
(∑n
i=1(pi − 12 )xi
)
. We were surprised to discover that,
though the ratio P(fLC(X) 6= Y )/P(fOPT(X) 6= Y ) can be made arbitrarily
large by setting p1 ≈ 1 and the remaining pi < 1 − ε, the absolute gap ap-
pears to be rather small: we conjecture (with some heuristic justification) that
supn≥1 supp∈[0,1]n ∆n(p) = 1/16. For fˆ
Ba, we used αi = βi = 1 for all i. The
results are reported in Figure 1.
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 p = (0.5025,  0.5074,  0.7368,  0.7728,  0.9997)
 
 
N-P optimal: fOPT
Simple majority: fMAJ
Low confidence: fˆLC
High confidence: fˆHC
Bayesian: fˆBa
Figure 1: For very small sample sizes, fˆLC outperforms fˆHC but is outperformed
by fˆBa. Starting from sample size ≈ 13, fˆHC dominates the other empirical
rules. The empirical rules are (essentially) sandwiched between fOPT and fMAJ.
Bayesian setting. In each trial, a vector of expert competences p ∈ [0, 1]n
was drawn independently componentwise, with pi ∼ Beta(1, 1). These values
(i.e., αi = βi ≡ 1) were used for fˆBa. The results are reported in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Unsurprisingly, fˆBa uniformly outperforms the other two empirical
rules. We found it somewhat surprising that fˆHC required so many samples
(about 60 on average) to overtake fˆLC. The simple majority rule fMAJ (off the
chart) performed at an average accuracy of 50%, as expected.
7 Discussion
The classic and seemingly well-understood problem of the consistency of weighted
majority votes continues to reveal untapped depth and suggest challenging un-
resolved questions. We hope that the results and open problems presented here
will stimulate future research.
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Appendix: Deferred proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. Since F is symmetric about x = 12 , it suffices to prove the
claim for 12 ≤ x < 1. We will show that F is concave by examining its second
derivative:
F ′′(x) = −2x− 1− 2x(1− x) log(x/(1− x))
x(1− x)(2x − 1)3 .
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The denominator is obviously nonnegative on [ 12 , 1], while the numerator has
the Taylor expansion
∞∑
n=1
22(n+1)(x − 12 )2n+1
4n2 − 1 ≥ 0,
1
2 ≤ x < 1
(verified through tedious but straightforward calculus). Since F is concave and
symmetric about 12 , its maximum occurs at F (
1
2 ) =
1
2 .
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